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1 Introduction
Natural language understanding applications such as interactive planning [1] and face-to-
face translation [20] require extensive inferencing. Many of these inferences are based on
the meaning of particular open class
1
words. Providing a representation that can support
such lexically-based inferences is a primary concern of lexical semantics.
2
The represen-
tation language of rst order logic (FOL) has well-understood semantics and a multitude
of inferencing systems have been implemented for it. Thus it is a prime candidate to
serve as a lexical semantics representation. However, we argue that FOL, although a good
starting point, needs to be extended before it can eciently and concisely support all the
lexically-based inferences needed.
Most lexical semantics representation systems utilize either KL-ONE-inspired termi-
nological logics [6, 2, 15, 21] or typed feature structure (TFS) logics [11, 10]. Represen-
tationally, terminological logics are subsets of FOL [29, 35, 7, 36, 14] as are TFS log-
ics [29, 19, 18, 37].
3
Thus, we suggest that lexical semanticists interested in supporting
lexically-based inferences need to look for ways to enrich their representational systems.
We are not alone in this suggestion (see [8, 32, 26]). However, to our knowledge the specic
extensions we suggest are novel to the lexical semantics literature.
Most of the examples on which we base our arguments are from an interactive planning
dialogue understanding project: the TRAINS project [1]. The goal of the TRAINS project
1
Open class words are those that are either adjectives, adverbs, nouns, or verbs. Closed class words are
prepositions, determiners, conjunctions, etc.
2
Lexical semantics is also concerned with issues besides supporting inference. A prominent line of research
in lexical semantics concerns itself with the link between a verb's meaning and its syntactic characteristics
(see [23]).
3
It should be noted that many of the systems that use TFS logics, view their TFS representations
as descriptions/short-hand for a more expressive semantic representation not as the representation itself
[31, 10, 33]. The argument presented here is compatible with this position.
1
is to build a system that can assist a human manager who is attempting to solve a planning
problem. The domain includes trains, rail connections, goods, cities, factories, etc. The
computer system will have knowledge about the current state of the world, schedules,
timetables, and other relevant information and will interact with the manager in spoken
English. A typical planning problem would be to deliver 1000 gallons of orange juice to
a specic city by a certain time. To solve this problem the manager would be assisted by
the system in scheduling the delivery of the oranges to the orange juice factory and the
subsequent shipping of juice to the designated city.
A prototype of the system has been implemented (see [1]). In addition, actual dialogues
have been collected in which the role of the system is played by a human in order to deter-
mine what natural dialogues are like (see [13]). By relying mostly on examples taken from
these dialogues, we illustrate the relevance of the issues we address to mundane, naturally
occurring discourse. Moreover, the dialogues provide a task-oriented context in which it is
generally clear what inferences are required for understanding a given utterance; thus they
provide a more constrained framework for semantic theorizing and experimentation than
unrestricted texts or dialogues.
Before we can proceed we need to specify what are and what are not lexically-based
inferences. A lexically-based inference is one that depends on a lexical axiom. A lexical
axiom is one that involves a semantic atom that is the translation of an open class word
(assuming a meaning postulate approach). The following axiom is a lexical axiom and links
the verb enter with its result state.
(1) 8x8y[result-state(enter(x; y))  contained-in(x; y)]
Using it, we could make a lexically-based inference from the boxcar entered the factory that
the boxcar is in the factory. Furthermore, this inference is based on the word enter and not
on the word boxcar . Such inferences can be contrasted with \structural" inferences such as
in (2):
(2) there are at least three cities with orange juice factories and large train stations !
there are at least three cities with orange juice factories
This depends on properties of certain classes of logical operators, specically the class of
upward monotone quantiers [4] and the conjunction operator, rather than on the lexical
semantics of specic open-class words. Note that if one substitutes the downward monotone
quantier fewer than three for at least three the inference no longer follows.
Besides distinguishing lexically-based inferences from structural ones, we also intend to
distinguish them from inferences based on world knowledge. Without getting too embroiled
in the issue of whether there is a formal and sharp distinction between knowledge about
lexical meanings and world knowledge, we want to identify lexical knowledge with the sort
2
of knowledge usually treated as terminological knowledge in KR systems. Ultimately a
formal distinction may require use of a necessity-like modal operator in axioms like (1), to
capture the truth of such axioms in all worlds (or situations), but we set aside this issue
here.
2 Extensions to FOL needed to support lexically-based in-
ferences
In this section we will introduce a number of extensions to FOL and provide examples that
motivate them. More specically, one should add restricted quantication and non-standard
quantiers, modal operators, predicate modication, and predicate nominalization. These
representational tools are available in some systems for sentence-level semantics [16, 28, 3].
It should be noted at the outset that each example used to motivate an extension can
be handled in FOL. However, the use of FOL leads to complex and unnatural paraphrases
of intuitively simple facts, makes the encoded knowledge harder for system developers to
comprehend and modify, and complicates inference. By adding a small amount of expressive
power, concise and comprehensible representations can be given which facilitate ecient
inferencing.
In our examples, we distinguish direct and indirect motivation of specic extensions to
FOL; i.e., a lexical item may directly correspond to a type of operator (such as predicate
modiers) unavailable in FOL, and it may indirectly involve nonstandard operators through
its axiomatization. Our argumentation is necessarily sharply abridged for this abstract.
2.1 Non-standard quantiers and restricted quantication
We begin with an extension for which we cannot yet muster much evidence from TRAINS,
but for which there are good reasons from a more general perspective and which already
enjoys rather broad acceptance.
Previously, when circumscribing lexically-based inferences, we mentioned upward mono-
tone quantiers. These include at least three (see (2)), all, a few, most, etc. Such examples
motivate the augmentation of FOL with corresponding nonstandard quantiers; and the
nominals with which they combine (as in at least three cities with orange juice factories)
motivate the inclusion of formulas restricting the domains of the quantied variables.
4
. By
utilizing these extensions, the following axiom enables inferences like the one in (2) to be
made eciently.
4
A number of terminological logics are sorted logics (e.g. [32]). In sorted logics, the domain of a variable
is restricted by the variable's sort. Representationally, this is much like restricted quantication, though
more limited.
3
(3) For all upward monotone quantiers Q and all predicates P
1
, P
2
, and P
3
:
Q x : P
1
(x) [P
2
(x) ^ P
3
(x)]  Q x : P
1
(x) [P
2
(x)]
Note that no reasoning about cardinality is required.
As a direct motivation for a nonstandard quantier syntax, the above argument pertains
only to the closed category of determiners (in combination with certain adverbs and numeral
adjectives). However, it it clear that this syntax will also simplify the axiomatization of
many open-class words in future extensions of the TRAINS vocabulary. As a constructed
(but uncontrived) example consider (4) and assume that the system has in its knowledge
base that the majority of cars are tankers and are in Elmira
(4)M: Are the majority of the cars tankers?
It should be able to infer that the majority are tankers. By using the axiom below and
a suitable treatment of conjunction, the system could make use of the axioms for upward
monotone quantiers.
(5) 8a; b majority(a; b)  Most z : [z 2 a] [z 2 b]
In the above axiom we assume that a and b denote collections and that 2 has been appro-
priately axiomatized.
Some other words that would benet from non-standard quantiers and restricted quan-
tication are scarce, rare, minority, scant, and predominate. We also expect that degree
adjectives such as expensive, dicult, or intelligent will require axiomatizations involving
nonstandard, restricted quantiers. For example, a dicult problem in the TRAINS domain
is one that exacts more time and eort from the problem solver(s) than most problems in
this domain. Similarly dispositional adjectives such as perishable or fragile and frequency
adverbs such as usually also call for restricted nonstandard quantication in their axioma-
tization, but we omit further details here.
2.2 Modal operators (or modal predicates)
Standard FOL has diculty representing necessity, possibility and propositional attitudes.
Yet examples like (6) and (7) involve adverbs that are most naturally viewed as modal
operators:
(6)M: That will probably work
(7)M: Maybe we'll get lucky again
In its context of occurrence, the second sentence refers to the possibility that all the
orange juice needed for certain deliveries already exists, obviating the need for orange juice
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production. It would clearly be hazardous for the system to ignore the adverbs, turning
mere wishful thinking into fact!
Such examples provide direct motivation for allowing modal operators in lexical seman-
tics. The argument is weakened by the fact that modal adverbs are somewhat marginal as
an open class of lexical items; but we can also argue from adjectives such as reasonable,
reliable, correct and right, and verbs such as found out that ..., said that ..., would like to
..., make sure ..., trying to ..., wonder if ..., believe, and assume. We restrict our further
comments here to some observed uses of correct and reliable. For instance, in the following
request for conrmation, the system should interpret correct as applying to the proposition
that the time is 2 pm:
(8)M: The time is two pm { is that correct?
Now if the system believes that the time is indeed 2 pm, it should surely infer an
armative answer to the question { i.e., that it is correct that the time is 2 pm. Thus for
the relevant sense of correct, the lexical semantics should tell the system that for any closed
formula ,
(9) correct()  .
If we adopt such a schema for the meaning of correct, we are treating it as a modal
operator. An alternative is to assume that correct is a predicate, but one that applies
to propositions. In turn, such an approach calls for the introduction of a reifying operator
(such as that) for converting sentence contents (propositions) into individuals, allowing their
use as predicate arguments. In either case, we are introducing a modal extension to FOL.
The case of reliable is similar but more subtle. In actually occurring examples this property
is often ascribed to items of information:
(10)M: That's reliable information
Intuitively, reliable information is not necessarily correct, though it is necessarily well-
founded (i.e., there are good reasons for the presumption of truth). So the axiomatization is
less trivial than (9) (and we omit details here), but it still calls for use of a modal operator
or modal predicate in the same way.
Concerning indirect motivation for modals, an interesting example is compatible (with),
as used in
(11)M: So that sounds like a good temporary plan { let's see if it's compatible with our
next objective here which is to deliver a boxcar of bananas to Corning
5
In order for the plan in (11) to be compatible with the additional banana delivery, it must
be possible to realize both action types (within the given temporal and other constraints).
In general,
(12) 8x; y[[action-type(x)^ action-type(y)^ compatible-with(x; y)]
39x
0
; y
0
[realize(x
0
; x) ^ realize(y
0
; y)]] :
(We comment on action types in a later subsection.) The semantics of the modal
operator 3 requires a model structure with either possible worlds (e.g. [27]) or situations
(e.g. [5]). 3 entails that there exists a situation or possible world suciently connected
to the current one where  is true. (Cf. Dowty's use of the 3 operator in his treatment of
the semantics of the sux -able [12].)
2.3 Predicate modication
By predicate modication we mean the transformation of one predicate into another.
Within a general setting for language understanding, we could most easily make the case for
allowing predicate modifying operators by pointing to nonintersective attributive adjectives
such as former, cancelled, fake, supposed, simulated, or cticious. For instance, applying
cancelled to an event nominal such as trip yields a new predicate which is not true of ac-
tual trips, and so should not be analysed as a conjunction of cancelled and trip. However,
such adjectives do not occur in the TRAINS dialogues collected so far, and we will instead
use certain verbs (make, get, look, sound, seem, begin, construct) as direct motivation for
predicate modiers.
For instance, the dialogues contain instances where the manager asks
(13)M: Does that sound reasonable?
(referring to a plan), or comments
(14)M: Problem number two looks dicult.
Now a plan can sound reasonable even if more careful analysis reveals it to be unreasonable.
So the system should realize that an armative response to the query merely requires the
absence of obvious aws in the plan (detectable with limited inferential eort), rather than
an actual proof of correctness.
One could attempt to handle such locutions by decomposing them into more complex
modal patterns; e.g., x sounds P, for P a predicate, might be decomposed into something
like \When one considers x, one (initially) feels that x is P". This is precisely the strategy
that has often been suggested for for intensional verbs such as seeks. But while plausible
denitions (decompositions) exist for some intensional verbs, they are very dicult to
6
contrive for ones like resemble (as in The one-horned goat resembled a unicorn) or imagine.
A more general, straightforward approach is to add predicate modiers to FOL. Thus
the translation of sounds (when it takes an adjectival complement) would be a predicate
modier, whose meaning is constrained { but not dened { by axioms like the following:
5
(15) For all monadic predicates P :
8xsounds(P )(x) 
8s; t[person(s) ^ consider(s; x; t)  feel-that(s; P (x);end-of(t))]
where we are neglecting various subtleties for the sake of brevity.
6
Thus to answer (13), the
system would make use of (15) to infer that it need only \consider" the plan in question,
until it \feels-that" (i.e., tentatively concludes that) the plan is reasonable or otherwise.
Finally, we mention a third class of examples directly motivating predicate modiers,
namely certain VP adverbs such as almost, nearly and apparently. Again, these do not
appear (as yet) in our corpus, but of course are common in other corpora. For example,
the \pear stories" of Chafe [9] contain examples such as \[the boy on the bicycle] almost
ran into a girl", where the desired inference is that he did not run into her, but came very
close to her.
2.4 Predicate nominalization
By predicate nominalization we mean the formation of terms (denoting individuals in
the domain of discourse) from predicates (denoting classes of objects, actions or events).
In other words, predicate nominalization involves the reication of properties (inluding
kinds/species, action types, and event types) by application of nominalizing (reifying) oper-
ators.
Our line of argument for allowing such operators in the logic employed for lexical se-
mantics is less direct (but we hope no less convincing) than for the previous extensions.
We claim that (1) many lexical entries correspond to predicates with one or more argu-
ments ranging over kinds of things, properties, and actions/events (this already came up
incidentally in (11)); and (2) the lexical axioms describing these entries will either explicitly
involve nominalized predicates or require the substitution of nominalized predicates when
used for inference.
5
Note that an equivalence need not be denitional. For instance, a triangle is a polygon whose interior
angles add up to 180 degrees { but that is not its denition.
6
This is, of course, the Montagovian approach, though we are dispensing with Montague's intension
operator (writing sounds(P )(x) rather than sounds(
^
P )(x)) by relying on a slight departure from standard
intensional semantics that treats the world (or situation) argument as the last, rather than rst, argument
of the semantic value of a predicate [17].
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As examples of a variety of lexical predicates over (reied) action types, consider the
italicized words in the following TRAINS excerpts. We have underlined corresponding
action-type arguments where these are explicitly present.
(16)M: What is the best way for me to accomplish my task ...
(17) S: That's a little beyond my abilities
(18) S: The way it's going to work is, engine E2 is going to go to city E ...
(19) S: Our current plan is to ll ... tankers T3 and T4 with beer ...
(20) S: One other suggestion would be that you take the other tanker which isn't being
used ...
(21)M: That's not gonna work
(22) S: Well that will delay departure
(23) S: Right, we can begin production ...
(24)M: ... send it o on a particular route and do it several times
Clearly way, task, plan, and suggestion as used in (16 - 20) are predicates over types of ac-
tions or events, as the underlined arguments conrm. For instance, the action descriptions
underlined in (18) and (19) do not refer to particular future actions at particular times, but
to types of actions whose eventual realization is hoped to solve the problem at hand. (And
the ability deictically referred to in (17) is the ability to specify the best way for the manager
to accomplish the current task in (16) { again an action type.) Similarly (21 - 24) illustrate
verbs whose subject or object ranges over action types. Note for instance in (22) that a
particular departure event cannot be delayed { particular events have xed times of oc-
currence, but event types in general do not. Likewise in (24), only an action type, not a
particular action, can be done \several times".
Similarly the following excerpts contain predicates over kinds/species, again with cor-
responding arguments underlined:
(25)M: One boxcar of oranges is enough to produce the required amount of orange juice
(26)M: And ll two tankers with beer
(27)M: There's [an] unlimited source of malt and hops ...
Note that in (25) the underlined subject of enough refers to a kind of load or quantity, not
to any particular load. Similarly the underlined objects of ll with and source of in (26)
and (27) are kinds of stu, not particular realizations of them. (In fact, no particular batch
of malt and hops could be \unlimited".)
Turning to the second step of our argumentation, concerning the explicit occurrence
of nominalization operators in argument positions of predicates like those above, one very
brief example will have to suce here. Consider the sense of do with an action type as
object, as in (24). Now to understand (24), the system will have to substitute a term for
the action type, \send [the train] o on a particular route", for the pronoun. To infer any
further consequences, it will need a meaning postulate something like the following:
8
(28) For all monadic action predicates P :
8x do(Ka(P ))(x)  P (x)
where Ka reies an action predicate (in this case, \send [the train] o on a particular route").
It can then apply semantic and world knowledge about P to draw conclusions about the
eects of P (x) (in this case that the train will follow the route in question and reach its
destination).
3 Conclusion
A popular goal for the future is to build intelligent agents that we can communicate with
using natural language. If this goal is to be attained such agents will have to be able to
perform complex inferencing. This will require lexicons that can support extensive lexically-
based inferencing. In order to support these inferences, representations for lexical semantics
will have to be richer than they are now. We have provided motivations for particular
extensions, drawing many of the illustrations from actual dialogues in the TRAINS domain
{ a \practical" domain of the sort for which we can realistically endeavor to build an
intelligent assistant.
Fortunately, the extensions of FOL for which we have argued are not new (as noted
at the outset). Indeed, they are a subset of the extensions that are available in Episodic
Logic (EL) [16, 17], a logic designed to be expressively and inferentially adequate as both a
logical form for natural language and as a general representation for commonsense knowl-
edge. Similar formalisms are those used in the Core Language Engine [2, 3] and Nerbonne
and Laubsch's NLL [22, 30]. EL is an intensional, situational extension of FOL that pro-
vides a systematic syntax and formal semantics for sentence and predicate nominalization
(reication), sentence and predicate modication, nonstandard restricted quantiers, -
abstraction, and pairing of arbitrary sentences with situation- (episode-) denoting terms
(where those sentences are interpreted as describing or characterizing those situations).
Inference in EL has been shown to be practical through the EPILOG implementation
[34], with examples ranging from fairy tale fragments and aircraft maintenance reports
[16, 17] to the Steamroller theorem-proving problem. As well, EL as been used as the
front-end logical form in the TRAINS system [1]. A gratifying conclusion from the text
understanding experiments is that increased expressiveness often simplies inference, al-
lowing conclusions to be drawn in one or two steps that would require numerous steps in an
FOL \reduction" of the same information. Finally, EL has been used as a representation
for forming hypotheses about meanings of derived words, such as reload (given a lexical
entry for load), and performance (given a lexical entry for perform) [24, 25]. As might be
expected, the representational requirements for expressing such hypotheses are very similar
to those we have pointed out here.
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By allowing the same exibility in the representation of lexical semantics as is provided
by logics like EL for sentence-level semantics, we should be able to combine lexical semantic
knowledge with world knowledge in a uniform, integrated fashion to achieve understanding
at least in restricted, task-oriented domains.
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